Abstract-Due to the recent proliferation of cyber-attacks, improving the robustness of wireless sensor networks (WSNs), so that they can withstand node failures has become a critical issue. Scale-free WSNs are important, because they tolerate random attacks very well; however, they can be vulnerable to malicious attacks, which particularly target certain important nodes. To address this shortcoming, this paper first presents a new modeling strategy to generate scale-free network topologies, which considers the constraints in WSNs, such as the communication range and the threshold on the maximum node degree. Then, ROSE, a novel robustness enhancing algorithm for scalefree WSNs, is proposed. Given a scale-free topology, ROSE exploits the position and degree information of nodes to rearrange the edges to resemble an onion-like structure, which has been proven to be robust against malicious attacks. Meanwhile, ROSE keeps the degree of each node in the topology unchanged such that the resulting topology remains scale-free. The extensive experimental results verify that our new modeling strategy indeed generates scale-free network topologies for WSNs, and ROSE can significantly improve the robustness of the network topologies generated by our modeling strategy. Moreover, we compare ROSE with two existing robustness enhancing algorithms, showing that ROSE outperforms both.
topology describes the wireless communications among the various sensor nodes in WSNs and is the basis for the design of various network communication protocols and routing protocols [7] , which play a vital role in network properties, such as network lifetime, energy consumption, reliability, and data latency. In recent years, because of the surge in cyber attacks [8] , [9] , enhancing the robustness of the WSNs has become a critical issue.
In this study, we focused on improving the robustness of the network topologies [10] , [11] for WSNs. That is, our objective was to devise a method whereby the connection of as many nodes as possible is preserved after certain node failures resulting from cyber attacks. In terms of target selection for attacks, there are two types of attack: random and malicious [12] , [13] . In random attacks, the attacker randomly chooses nodes in the network topology as the targets, whereas in malicious attacks, the attacker chooses the nodes with high node degrees as the targets. It is known that some types of network topologies are resistant to random attacks and some are resistant to malicious attacks.
In this study, in particular the robustness of one type of network topology, the scale-free topology [14] , [15] , for WSNs was investigated. The scale-free topology belongs to the field of complex network theory [16] , [17] , which has broad applications in the real world, such as in global transportation networks [18] , cooperation networks [19] , social networks [20] , and mobile networks [21] . In complex network theory, small world topology [22] and scale-free topology [14] , [15] are two classic models. The small world model has two characteristics: a smaller average path length and a relatively high clustering coefficient. It is in general used in the modeling of heterogeneous network topologies [23] . In contrast, the scale-free model is in general used in modeling homogeneous network topologies [24] , and therefore, is more suitable for WSNs in which most nodes have a similar transmission range and bandwidth. The node degree in scale-free topology follows a power-law distribution. This means that the majority of nodes in a scale-free network have low degrees. Thus, in random attacks, low degree nodes are more likely to be targeted. Since a low degree node in general does not significantly affect network connectivity, the scale-free topology is robust against random attacks. However, according to [13] , a scalefree topology can be fragile under malicious attacks. Thus, the enhancement of the robustness of the scale-free topology so that WSNs can withstand malicious attacks is an important research problem.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows.
• A method for generating scale-free networks for WSNs where the nodes are homogeneous (i.e., the nodes have an identical communication radius and energy capacity) is described.
• The proposed algorithm, ROSE, enhances the robustness of scale-free networks against malicious attacks without changing the node degree distribution. ROSE consists of two phases: the degree difference and the angle sum operation. Both operations are aimed to transform the network topology toward the onion-like structure, which was shown in [25] to be robust against the malicious attacks. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a brief survey of related work is presented. Section 3 describes our modeling strategy of scale-free network topologies in WSNs. Section 4 introduces the basic ideas of our new robustness enhancing algorithm, namely ROSE. Section 5 provides details of the algorithms in our modeling strategy and the realization of ROSE. We present the evaluation results of the performance of the ROSE, hill climbing [26] , and simulated annealing [27] algorithms in Section 6. Finally, in Section 7 we summarize the main results and discuss our future work.
II. RELATED WORK
In order to generate the power-law distribution of node degrees in scale-free networks, Barabási and Albert proposed the so-called the Barabási-Albert (BA) model [14] , which applies the following two criteria to achieve a scale-free topology.
1) Growth: new nodes join the network one by one.
2) The newly joined node connects to an existing node with a probability that is proportional to the degree of the existing node. This leads to the phenomenon that the more connections a node has, the more likely it is that this node receives new connections. This phenomenon is also known as the "Mathew Effect." The two criteria above can successfully generate the powerlaw distribution of node degrees, which was proved by Barabási and Albert in [28] .
Because of the limited communication range in WSNs, each node does not have sufficient neighbors and cannot establish very many edges. Hence, the preferential attachment property of the BA model cannot be simulated directly in WSNs. In recent years, many researchers have focused on the application of scale-free network topologies in WSNs. Liu et al. [29] proposed a complex network model based on heterogeneous networks used in WSNs. This model has both small world and scale-free properties. Du et al. [30] studied the shortest path feature of scale-free networks and designed a transportation system that is relatively efficient. Zhenget al. [31] , [32] also designed two robust scale-free network topologies, the linear growth evolution model (LGEM) and the accelerated growth evolution model (AGEM). They focused on actual situations, such as the increase or removal of nodes and the reconstruction of edges. Jianet al. [33] proposed a new energy-aware scale-free model based on the BA model, named energy-aware BA (EABA). They presented tunable coefficients to balance the connectivity and energy consumption of a scale-free network topology. These authors took both the energy balance and transmission performance into account, which increases the data overhead during the modeling process. Thus, a tradeoff solution between the scalefree property and modeling overhead is required.
In scale-free networks, a small number of nodes have very high degrees, which renders these networks vulnerable to malicious attacks. When a node with high degree fails, the large number of edges incident on it are removed at the same time. The entire network topology is thus quickly fragmented. Therefore, the main purpose of this study was to improve the robustness of scale-free networks in WSNs against malicious attacks. The addition of edges or relay nodes can directly solve or alleviate this problem. However, additional edges destroy the original scale-free property and consume additional energy. Therefore, the optimizing process of network robustness against malicious attacks cannot change the degree distribution of the initial network topology. In addition to the modeling strategies for scale-free networks, robustness enhancing strategies have been of interest to a large number of researchers in recent years. Schneider et al. [25] introduced a new metric of robustness. They considered the largest connected cluster after each attack and described the robustness by the proportion of residual connected network nodes in all network nodes. Herrmann et al. [26] proposed a hill climbing algorithm based on robustness metric R, which makes the network topologies resemble a stable onion-like structure through swapping edges. However, the multimodal phenomenon may prevent the algorithm from jumping out of the local optimum. Buesseret al. [27] presented a simulated annealing algorithm that has a significantly better performance. It uses a probabilistic swapping strategy to handle the multimodal phenomenon and enhance the robustness of the network topology. This algorithm also can be used in the robustness enhancing process of scale-free networks in WSNs, but it causes many redundant comparisons, and therefore, efficiency is greatly decreased. Louzadaet al. [34] proposed a smart rewiring method, which determines the edges that need to be compared by using two-fold selections. Zhou and Liu [35] designed a memetic algorithm, which is a type of significance enhancing method that combines both global and local searching to improve the robustness of scale-free networks against malicious attacks without changing the degree distribution. However, the smart rewiring [34] and the memetic algorithm [35] do not consider the limitation of the communication range for network nodes, and therefore are not suitable for WSNs.
III. SCALE-FREE MODEL IN WIRELESS
SENSOR NETWORKS In this section, we present a modeling strategy of scale-free topologies in WSNs and verify the scale-free property based on the complex network theory.
A. Barabási-Albert Model in Wireless Sensor Networks
Because of the limitation of communication range in WSNs, a newly joined node may not have sufficient neighbors with which to connect, and therefore, the preferential attachment property of the BA model is not readily available. To overcome this problem, this study considered WSNs with a dense topology (i.e., a node can have many neighbors in its communication range). Dense WSNs will be common in the future, as with the advent of the era of the Internet of Things (IoT) the communication capability of sensors will be greatly improved and the price of sensors will become considerably lower, so that a large amount of sensors will be deployed in homes, buildings, hospitals, and shopping centers, to support various intelligent services. Because of the high communication capability and the large quantity of sensors, the WSNs formed will be dense. Moreover, significant research effort [36] , [37] has been invested in studies that consider dense WSNs. In particular, dense WSNs are very suitable for the scenarios where network nodes are prone to fail. Thus, it is meaningful to consider dense WSNs when studying network robustness.
According to the experience we gained from our extensive simulations, in order to achieve the density necessary to establish scale-free topologies, the communication radius of sensor nodes should be sufficiently large to allow sensor nodes to connect to approximately 50% of nodes in the network on average. If the communication radius is not sufficiently large, the high degree nodes are scattered in the network. In this case, we partition the network into several clusters based on the locations of high degree nodes and form an "onion-like" structure in each cluster, and then enhance the robustness for each cluster using ROSE. Our simulation results presented in Section 6.6 show that ROSE achieves a performance on partitioned networks that is similar to that on non-partitioned networks.
Specifically, we adapt the well-known BA model mentioned in the previous section to construct scale-free topologies for WSNs. To achieve this, we considered mainly the following three aspects.
1) The preferential attachment process is limited to the nodes within communication range of each other. 2) We control the maximum degree of nodes to prevent excessive energy consumption. The energy of each node is limited. If some nodes in WSNs have too high a degree, they have to handle too much traffic. Hence, their energy can be consumed quickly. If there is not sufficient energy to support the node, the entire network topology soon collapses. Therefore, the maximum degree of a node must be limited. 3) We need to determine the joining order for the nodes such that the high degree nodes are close to the center of the topology. According to the aspects mentioned above, we apply the following three improvements to construct a scale-free network topology for WSNs. First, each newly joined node must have sufficient neighbor nodes in its communication range. Hence, we put all the nodes into the network topology initially, instead of one by one. At this time, all the nodes are isolated.
In order to imitate the growth process in the BA model, we then require that the nodes join the network (i.e., establish edges) in a sequential order. This means that the process of adding edges for each node is asynchronous. Each node needs to record the degree information of its neighbors. We assume that all the neighbors in the communication range of a newly joined node is its local world, and the neighbors that are already connected with the newly joined node or reached the maximum degree do not belong to the local world of the newly joined node. The newly joined node tends to connect with a higher degree node. All nodes add connections following the order from the center to the outlying area of the network topology. We define the connection probability Π Local (i) for a neighbor node i as
where d i is the degree of node i and n is the total number of neighbors of the newly joined node. Fig. 1 describes the specific situation of connection probability during the preferential attachment process. It contains all the possibilities for a node to add connections in the network. We summarize them as three types of node: i, j, and k. The solid blue lines represent the edges that are added during the modeling process. The four neighbors in the local world of node i are all isolated. Thus, when node i broadcasts the request to add edges, it chooses m neighbors with which to establish a connection with equal probability. However, the five neighbors in the local world of node j have different degrees: 7, 5, 3, 2, and 1. The connection probabilities can be calculated from Eq. (1), and they are 0.3888, 0.2777, 0.1677, 0.1111, and 0.0555, respectively. Then, it chooses m neighbors with which to establish a connection by using the roulette method. In the roulette method, the nodes normalize all the connection probabilities and this places them in the range from 0 to 1 based on their value. The larger the connection probability, the larger the range it occupies. Then, a random number is produced in the range [0, 1]. Node j selects the neighbor having a range that contains the random number. There exist not only isolated nodes, but also connected nodes in the local world of node k. The connected nodes, k 1 and k 2 , the degrees of which are 1 and 3, are prior considered by node k. Node k determines the connection scheme according to the value of m, the threshold of which is equal to the number of connected nodes. As shown in Fig. 1 , the threshold of m is 2. If m > 2, in addition to establishing connections with nodes k 1 and k 2 , the node selects m − 2 neighbors with which to establish a connection in equal probability. If m = 2, node k establishes connections with nodes k 1 and k 2 directly without calculation. If m < 2, it calculates the connection probabilities of nodes k 1 and k 2 , which are 0.25 and 0.75, and then uses the roulette method to select the neighbor. Otherwise, if a node cannot find sufficient m neighbors with which to connect, it fails. The scale-free network is a dense network. Each node has many neighbor nodes. That many nodes fail during the modeling process is almost impossible. In addition, failure of a few nodes does not affect the scale-free property of the entire network.
Second, the maximum degree of each node is limited during the modeling process. When a node joins the network, it achieves the degree information of its neighbors. If the degree of a neighbor reaches the maximum value, the node removes this neighbor from its neighbor list. Therefore, a maximum degree neighbor no longer connects with other nodes.
Third, we stipulate the following order for the nodes to join the network so that the network starts to approach the onion-like structure during the growth process. Each node has a GPS module to obtain its coordinates. We locate a starting node near the center of the network, the red node shown in Fig. 2 . The process of adding connections begins from this starting node. Since we assume the value of m is 2, two new connections (depicted by the blue lines in Fig. 2 ) are added to the starting node. Then, the starting node broadcasts a start packet to its neighbors including its coordinates. When a neighbor node receives the packet, it sets a timer immediately. The timer is defined as Eq. (2).
where, r x and r y and s x and s y are the coordinates of the receiving node and the starting node, respectively. q is a parameter for controlling the value of T imer. Suppose that the timer of n 1 expires first; then, n 1 adds the new connection, as shown by the green lines in Fig. 2 . Then, n 1 forwards the start packet only if it receives the start packet for the first time. The receiving node repeats this process. It is noteworthy that a node discards the start packet if it has received it previously. We can ensure that the node near the starting node begins the process of adding connections earlier through this method. This process is repeated until all the nodes have joined the network. This strategy can be realized in the distributed system, and it meets the requirement that the nodes near the center of the network should tend to have higher node degrees than those near the boundary of the network. Thus, the network topology approaches the onion-like structure.
B. Metrics of Robustness
Under a local node failure or attacks, some nodes or edges of the topology are destroyed in WSNs, which leads in general to separation of the initial connected network. We assume the WSNs suffer random and malicious attacks. Random attacks comprise random selection and removal of nodes in a WSN to destroy the connectivity of the entire network. However, malicious attacks are aimed to destroy the most important node in a WSN and achieve the worst damage to the entire network topology. We determine the importance of nodes according to the degree. A node with a higher degree is more important than that with a lower degree. We determine a malicious attack scheme that is based on node degree to enhance the robustness of scale-free networks against malicious attacks. First, the degree of each node in the scale-free network is counted and the node with highest degree is removed. The edges connected to it are removed at the same time. Then, we reorder the remaining nodes by their degree. The current highest degree node is removed. This process is repeated until all the nodes are isolated in the network. If more than one node has the highest degree, we randomly select a node to attack. This attack scheme is more hostile, and therefore, the metrics of robustness based on this attack scheme can reflect the robustness against malicious attacks "more obvious."
In a recent paper, a new metric of robustness based on the percolation theory was proposed by Schneider et al. [25] . It considers the maximal connected subgraphs after the repeated removal of the highest degree node to measure the robustness of the network topology. We combined this metric with the malicious attacks scheme presented above, and describe network connectivity through calculating the proportion of maximal connected subgraphs of the entire network, and evaluate the extent of the damage. In a network with N nodes, the robustness metric R is defined as Eq. (3).
where M CS n represents the number of nodes in maximal connected subgraphs after the nth highest degree node is removed. The summation operation indicates that each attack is taken into consideration and the normalization factor 1/(N + 1) ensures that the robustness of networks having different sizes and edge densities can be compared. In different sized networks the network topologies have a different number of nodes, but each node adds the same number of edges, while in networks with different edge densities, the network topologies have the same number of nodes, but each node adds a different number of edges. If every node in the network topology connects with other N − 1 nodes, node failure does not influence the communication between any other nodes. Therefore, the maximum value of R corresponds to the fully connected network topology. In this case, R is given by Eq. (4),
However, each node cannot connect with the other N − 1 nodes because of the limitation of the communication radius in WSNs. The maximum value of R must be less than 0.5. If the network topology has only one node with high degree, the other nodes are also connected only with this node. We remove the highest degree node based on the malicious attack scheme at the first time, and then the entire network is isolated. Therefore, the minimum value of R corresponds to the star network topology. In this case, R is given by Eqs. (5) and (6),
The value of R lies strictly in the range (0, 0.5). We may calculate R according to the global information of the scalefree network topology in WSNs based on the definition of R. Thus, R cannot be achieved in distributed systems. The processes of evaluating and enhancing robustness need to be completed in centralized systems. The information of each node is sent to the sink node for centralized processing. R is applied to evaluate the robustness of a scale-free network topology. The larger the value of R, the more robust is the scale-free network topology against malicious attacks. The performance of the ROSE, hill climbing, and simulated annealing algorithms was also evaluated according to R.
IV. ROSE OVERVIEW
ROSE is designed to be processed in a centralized system. Before ROSE operates, each node sends its own coordinates and neighbor list to the centralized system through the multihop system. After we achieve the optimization results according to ROSE, the centralized system sends the new neighbor list to each node through the multi-hop system. To help explain ROSE, we first introduce the basic ideas of ROSE in this section. Then, we provide the details of ROSE in the following section.
In general, the design of ROSE is based on the observation of Schneider et al. [25] , [26] that graphs exhibiting an onionlike structure are robust to malicious attacks. Schneider et al. described the onion-like structure as a structure "consisting of a core of highly connected nodes hierarchically surrounded by rings of nodes with decreasing degrees." Note that Schneider et al. validated their observation only by extensive simulations. One year later, the theoretical analysis supporting this observation was provided by Tanizawaet al. [38] . Since the onionlike structure encompasses a family of network topologies, Tanizawa et al. analyzed one specific topology called the "interconnected random regular graphs" of this family, and proved its robustness against malicious attacks.
Given that the above observation about the onion-like structure has been validated both experimentally and theoretically, the ROSE algorithm is aimed to transform network topologies to exhibit the onion-like structure. Specifically, ROSE involves two phases: a degree difference operation and angle sum operation. In the following, we first introduce the concept of independentedges, which is used in both operations; then, we describe the basics of these two operations.
A. Independent Edges
Here, we represent a scale-free network topology as a graph G = (V, E), where V = {1, 2, ..., N } is the set of N nodes and E = {e ij |i, j ∈ V nd i = j} is the set of M edges. We state that two edges e ij and e kl are independent edges if they satisfy the following two requirements (see Fig. 3a ). 1) Each of nodes i, j, k, and l must be in the communication range of the other three nodes. This ensures that every node has the ability to establish a connection with others.
2) There are no extra connections between nodes i, j, k, and l, except the existing edges e ij and e kl . For a pair of independent edges, e ij and e kl , all three possible connection methods of nodes i, j, k, and l are illustrated in Fig. 3. Fig. 3a represents the original connection method, e ij and e kl ; Fig. 3b represents the first alternative connection method, e ik and e jl ; and Fig. 3c represents the second alternative connection method, e il and e jk . The primary idea of robustness enhancement is to improve the robustness of a scale-free network topology by swapping the edges into alternative connection methods. If the value of R is increased after a swap is executed, the swap is accepted; otherwise, not. Note that when a pair of edges e ij and e kl are swapped into the alternative connection methods, the degrees of nodes i, j, k, and l are preserved.
In the degree difference operation and angle sum operation described next, only when a pair of edges are independent edges are they considered for swapping; otherwise, not. This not only satisfies the WSNs communication range constraint on the sensor nodes, but also dramatically reduces the pairs of edges considered.
B. Degree Difference Operation
Schneider et al. [25] and Herrmann et al. [26] found that an onion-like structure is relatively stable and robust. The higher degree nodes are interconnected in the center of the scale-free network topology and surrounded by the lower degree nodes. The node degree presents a hierarchical structure from the center to the boundary. In an onion-like structure, the nodes that have the same or similar degrees are connected with each other. All the neighbors of a high degree node have high degrees. When the node fails, its neighbors can replace its original function and ensure the connectivity of the residual network. Thus, the destruction of malicious attacks is weakened to a great extent in WSNs. At the same time, the onion-like structure retains the property of the scalefree network. The majority of nodes have low degrees. It is also tolerant against random attacks. Hence, the onion-like structure is robust against both random and malicious attacks. According to Zhou and Liu [35] , the onion-like structure is very robust against targeted high degree attacks. It has an additional characteristic that interconnected nodes have the same or similar degree in the network topology. The degree difference between two connected nodes should be as low as possible.
During the edge swapping in the degree difference operation, the degree differences for all three possible connection methods, described in Eqs. (7), (8) , and (9), must be calculated. Then, the connection method that has the minimum degree difference is selected. If it does not destroy the initial network connectivity and does not reduce the value of R, it is accepted.
Note that the original idea of using degree difference to select edge pairs was reported by Zhou and Liu [35] and the advantage added by our method is that both alternative connection methods are considered when swapping edges to increase R, whereas in [35] only the first alternative connection method, as depicted in Fig. 3b , was considered. Furthermore, as mentioned in the related work section, the method in [35] was designed for general networks without the constraint of node communication range, and therefore is not suitable for WSNs.
Similarly to the method in [35] , to obtain a better robust enhancing effect of the scale-free network topology in WSNs, parameter p is proposed for limiting the degree difference during this process. The definition of p is shown in Eq. (10):
As can been seen in Eq. (10), the range of p is (0, 1]. Only when the degree difference between a pair of nodes is smaller than a certain percent of the initial degree difference are the values of R for different connection methods compared. Finally, the connection method that is satisfied with the limitation of p and does not reduce the value of R, is accepted. Therefore, p limits the threshold value of swapping. A suitable threshold not only greatly improves robustness, but also reduces the comparison times of R. The efficiency of the robustness enhancing algorithm is improved. The value of p was obtained based on many experiment iterations.
C. Angle Sum Operation
In addition to the characteristic that nodes in a ring have similar degrees, another characteristic of the onion-like structure is that in each ring of nodes there exists a large number of edges roughly horizontal with respect to the center of the network. Accordingly, we introduce an angle sum operation here that obtains the onion-like structure by exploiting this characteristic. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to exploit this characteristic.
The basic steps of this operation are as follows. First, we use the coordinates of the starting node as the network centroid. Second, for an edge e ij , we use an angle called the surrounding angle to reflect the degree to which the edge e ij is horizontal with respect to the centroid. The surrounding angle is obtained by using the following method. As depicted in Fig. 4a , the centroid of all nodes is denoted by the point c and the midpoint of the edge e ij is denoted by m 1 . Then, we connect c and m 1 . From the two complementary angles formed on the edge e ij , we select the smaller one (in the case of Fig. 4a , the angle α) as the surrounding angle for the edge e ij . Third, we obtain the surrounding angles for both members of a pair of independent edges e ij and e kl and calculate the sum of these two angles. For example, in Fig. 4a , the sum of these two angles is α + β. Finally, we consider the two alternative connection methods of the edges e ij and e kl , as depicted in Fig. 4b and Fig. 4c , and calculate their angle sums respectively. If the larger one of these two angle sums is greater than the angle sum of the original connection method, we test whether or not the alternative connection method with the larger angle sum increases R. If it does, we swap the edges into this alternative connection method. Note that we calculate the value of a surrounding angle by the cosine formula in trigonometry. This formula is given in Eq. (11) below, where len b and len c denote the lengths of adjacent edges for the surrounding angle α. len a denotes the length of the opposite edge for α. The following proof shows that if an edge has a larger surrounding angle, the distances of the two nodes of this edge from the network center are similar, and vice versa. Therefore, we can use the node distances from the network center to accomplish the angle sum operation.
Proof: In our topology construction strategy for WSNs, we restrict the order in which each node adds edges. Hence, the nodes near the center of the network tend to have larger degrees than those near the boundary of the network. If the distance of two nodes from the coordinates of the centroid is the same, they have the greatest probability of having the same or similar degrees.
In Fig. 5 , we assume that A and B are two nodes in the topology. C represents the coordinates of the centroid and M the middle point of AB. CN is perpendicular to AB. a, b, c, f , and g represent the length of the line segment, respectively. We can obtain the following equations through geometric calculation.
Then, we substitute Eq. (12) into Eq. (13) and obtain the relationship between a and b.
In Eq. (14), c and f are fixed parameters. The range of α is 0 to 90°. Hence, when the value of α is close to 90°, the lengths of a and b are close to equal. This means that the distances from nodes A and B to C are the same or similar. According to the features of the onion-like structure, A and B have the greatest probability to meet the restriction of similar degrees, and the connection should be accepted. Otherwise, the situation where α is close to 0 should be avoided.
In the angle sum operation, the connection method that has the largest α is accepted. The operation is also checked to ensure that it does not exert a negative effect on metric R. Hence, the angle sum operation can significantly improve the robustness of scale-free network topology.
The degree difference and angle sum operations enhance the robustness of scale-free networks differently. We added the restriction that only if the value of R increases can this swap be accepted. Therefore, the order of the two operations has no negative effects on the entire scale-free network. In order to achieve better robustness improvement effects, we tested the performance when the two operations were combined in different orders. Based on the simulation results, ROSE executes the degree difference operation first and the angle sum operation second.
The combination of the degree difference and the angle sum operations renders the structure of the scale-free network topology very close to being onion-like. Meanwhile, both operations avoid the calculation of R to the greatest extent possible. Therefore, the computation efficiency of ROSE is very high.
V. ALGORITHM DETAILS
In this section, we provide the design of the specific robustness enhancing algorithms for a scale-free network topology for all v i ∈ V do 3:
Setting timer 5: if Timer of v i expired then 6: broadcastStartPacket(v i ) 7: v i ← receiveDisconnectNeighborDegree() 8: if the degree of nodes in V i are all zero then 9: Π Local (j) = 1/N i 10:
for all v j ∈ V i do 12:
end for 14: end if 15: use Roulette method select m nodes in V i base on Π Local (j)
16:
Lst i = Modify neighbor list of v i 17: broadcastEndPacket(Lst i ) 18: broadcastStartingSignal() 19: end if 20: end for 21: end procedure in WSNs. Algorithm 1 describes the modeling process of a scale-free network topology in WSNs, which is executed during the startup time of the scale-free network. The variables used in the algorithm are as follows.
• N : the total number of nodes in the scale-free network topology.
• V : the set of all nodes in the scale-free network topology.
• V i : the set of nodes that are in the communication range of node i, but are not connected with it and have not reached the maximum degree.
• N i : the number of nodes in V i .
• r: the communication radius of each node.
• m: the number of edges that each newly joined node adds.
• Lst i : list of the neighbor nodes connected with node i. This algorithm operates as follows. First, a newly joined node i receives a starting signal and sets a timer (Lines 3 and 4). When the timer expires, it sends an add connection request to all neighbors. Then, it receives the degree information of nodes that are in the local world of node i (Lines 6 and 7). Next, node i calculates the connection probability of each neighbor based on feedback information. If the degree of each neighbor node is zero, node i connects with them with equal probability (Lines 8 to 9); otherwise, node i calculates the connection probability according to the degree of neighbor nodes (Lines 11 to 12). The codes in Lines 15 to 16 describe the process of establishing m edges between node i and its neighbors by the roulette method. Next, the neighbor list Lst i is updated and broadcast to all neighbor nodes. Finally, node i broadcasts a starting signal for the unjoined nodes (Line 18). for all edges in E do 3: Randomly select e ij and e kl 4: if e ij and e kl are unmarked && e ij and e kl are a pair of independent edges then 5:
if SU B == SU B 1 then
10:
A ← A (Remove e ij and e kl in A and Add e il and e jk to A ) 11: if NetworkFullConnected() and R(A ) ≥ R(A) then 12: A ← A 13: end if 14: else if SU B == SU B 2 then
15:
A ← A (Remove e ij and e kl in A and Add e ik and e jl to A ) 16: if NetworkFullConnected() and R(A ) ≥ R(A) then 17: A ← A 18: end if 19: end if 20: end if 21: Mark this pair of edges(e ij and e kl ). 22: end for 23: end procedure Algorithm 2 describes the process of the degree difference operation, which is executed after the modeling of the scalefree network topology in WSNs. The variables used in the algorithm are as follows.
• A: the adjacency matrix of the scale-free network topology.
• A : the adjacency matrix after the swap operation based on the degree difference.
A pair of independent edges is randomly selected, e ij and e kl (Lines 2 to 3). Then, the degree differences of all three connection methods are calculated. The connection method with the minimum degree difference is determined (Lines 5 to 8). If it is the initial connection method, the swapping operation is skipped and the next round of selecting edges begins; otherwise, the adjacency matrix A to A are modified based on the calculation result. If A keeps the network topology connected and does not reduce the value of R, this swapping operation is accepted (Lines 9 to 13). Otherwise, A is returned to A and the algorithm begins the next round of selecting edges. The codes in Lines 14 to 19 check another connection method in the same manner. This process continues until all the pairs of edges in the adjacency matrix have been examined. A ← A 2
12:
end if 13: end if 14: Mark this pair of edges(e ij and e kl ). 15: end for 16 : end procedure Algorithm 3 describes the process of the angle sum operation, which is executed after the degree difference operation. The variables used in the algorithm are as follows.
• A 1 , A 2 : the adjacency matrix after a swap operation based on the sum of surrounding angles. A pair of independent edges is randomly selected, e ij and e kl (Lines 2 to 3). Then, the sum of the surrounding angles for all the three connection methods is calculated. The connection method with the maximum angle sum is selected (Lines 5 to 7). If it is the initial connection method, the swapping operation is skipped and the next round of selecting edges begins; otherwise, the adjacency matrix A to A 1 or A 2 is modified based on the value of SU M . If the modification keeps the network topology connected and does not reduce the value of R, it is accepted (Lines 8 to 12) . Otherwise, the modified adjacency matrix is returned to A and the algorithm begins the next round of selecting edges. This process continues until all the pairs of edges in the adjacency matrix have been examined.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we first evaluate the scale-free properties of our proposed model. Then, the best value of p is confirmed through simulation experiments and we compare the performance of the degree difference operation and the angle sum operation in ROSE. Next, scale-free network topologies with different sizes and edge densities in WSNs are used to evaluate the performance and efficiency of the ROSE, hill climbing, and simulated annealing algorithms. All of the algorithms were simulated in MATLAB.
A. Scale-Free Properties Evaluation
We deployed network nodes randomly in a sensor field of 500 * 500 m 2 . Considering that each node must have sufficient neighbors during the modeling process, the communication radius r was set to 200 m. The parameter of the timer was q = 10. The maximum degree of all nodes was limited by the size and density of the network topology. It was set to 25 when N = 100 and m = 2. The maximum degree is increased by 5 when N is increased by 50 or m is increased by 1. Fig. 6 shows the scale-free properties of network topologies having different sizes and edge densities. The red dots represent the nodes. The size of the dot is used to distinguish different node degrees: a larger dot represents a higher degree. The black solid lines represent the connections between nodes. In Fig. 10a , the total number of nodes in a scale-free network topology in WSNs is 100. Each node needs to add two edges during the modeling process. As can be seen in Fig. 6 , the majority of nodes have a low degree. However, there are also a few nodes with high degree; they have more edges. As compared with Fig. 10a , in Fig. 6b the number of nodes is increased to 300 and in Fig. 6c the number of added edges is increased to 5. The figures also show that network topologies with different sizes and edge densities can maintain good scale-free properties. The second row of Fig. 6 shows the degree distribution of the three networks. P (d) is the probability of a node having a degree d. As can be seen, the degrees of all the nodes completely accord with power-law distribution. This proves that the scale-free network topology, which is modeled by the proposed strategy, maintains a good scale-free property.
B. Comparison of the Effect of the Degree Difference Operation and the Angle Sum Operation on the Scale-Free Network Topologies of Different Sizes in WSNs
Since p is a parameter that is in the range (0, 1], the best value of p had to be determined before these experiments were conducted. Therefore, we chose p with an interval of 0.1. We set three groups of different network parameters, where m = 2 and N = 100, m = 5 and N = 100, and m = 2 and N = 300, to test the improvement of R respectively after the enhancement by the ROSE algorithm. All the results correspond to the average of k(k > 10) independent runs. In Fig. 7 , the Y axis represents the improvement ratio of R after the degree difference operation. Because the initial value of R is different in the three lines, they cannot be compared. We need to focus on the tendency of each line. When p is in the range 0.7 to 1.0, the robustness performance of the scale-free network topology is better in all the three lines. The optimal value of p may not remain the same in network topologies having different sizes and edge densities because of the random deployment of nodes. As the results show, the best value of p is 0.9 for the networks where m = 2 and N = 100 and m = 5 and N = 100. However, the best value of p is 1.0 for the network where m = 2 and N = 300. Therefore, in order to compare the different algorithms under uniform conditions, the value of p was set as 0.9 in the following experiments. The degree difference operation and angle sum operation are two phases of ROSE. Both operations enhance the robustness against malicious attacks on scale-free network topologies in WSNs. However, their implementation mechanism differs. We compared the performance of the two operations separately and in combination in different orders of implementation on scale-free network topologies of different sizes in WSNs. The number of added edges was fixed at m = 2. The size of the scale-free networks was set to 100, 150, 200, 250, and 300 nodes, respectively. All the results correspond to the average of k(k > 10) independent runs. The error was derived from the variance in these independent runs.
As can be seen in Fig. 8 , both of the operations improve the robustness as compared to the initial scale-free networks. The value of R achieved by the degree difference operation is a little better than that achieved by the angle sum operation. Each step of the degree difference operation reduces the degree difference of independent edges. It exactly transforms the scale-free network topology to the onion-like structure. In contrast, in the angle sum operation, each step chooses the connection method that has the maximum possibility to change the original scale-free network topology such that it is close to the onion-like structure. Because of topological randomness, the robustness achieved by the degree difference operation is better than that achieved by the angle sum operation. The pink line in Fig. 8 represents that we used the angle sum operation first and then the degree difference operation. It is obvious that when we use any operation separately, the robustness enhancement is limited. The ASO_DDO and ROSE use these two operations in turn, and they show a considerably better performance. More importantly, when we use ROSE, the robustness enhancing performance is a little better.
C. Comparison of the Effect of ROSE and Other Algorithms on the Scale-Free Network Topologies of Different Sizes in WSNs
The performance of ROSE was simulated on scale-free network topologies of different sizes in WSNs. We compared ROSE with two existing algorithms, namely, the hill climbing algorithm [26] and the simulated annealing algorithm [27] . The number of added edges was fixed at m = 2. This ensured that all the network topologies had same edge density. The size of the scale-free networks was set to 100, 150, 200, 250, and 300 nodes, respectively. Fig. 9 shows a comparison of the performance of ROSE and the other algorithms on the scalefree network topologies of different sizes in WSNs. The results are averaged over k(k > 20) independent runs. As can be seen in Fig. 9 , the value of R shows a downward trend with an increase in the network size. All three algorithms improve the robustness significantly as compared to the initial scale-free networks. The robustness enhancing performance of the simulated annealing algorithm is better than that of the hill climbing algorithm. However, the value of R achieved by the simulated annealing algorithm reduces faster than that of the hill climbing algorithm with an increase in the network size. ROSE always shows a better robustness enhancing performance than the hill climbing and simulated annealing algorithms in scalefree network topologies of different sizes in WSNs.
The detailed data of each algorithm for the best, worst and average robustness results in the simulation are listed in Table I . The error is derived from the variance in k(k > 20) independent runs as Eq. (15). The larger the value of N , the bigger is the scale-free network size. The best, worst, and average values of R obtained by the simulated annealing algorithm are larger than those of the hill climbing algorithm. ROSE always shows the largest values of R, which means that it has the best robustness enhancing performance. Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 show the scale-free network topologies and degree distribution with 100 and 300 nodes, where m = 2 after robustness enhancement by the ROSE algorithm, respectively. The scale-free network topology resembles the onionlike structure after robustness enhancement by the ROSE algorithm. The nodes in communication range with a similar degree connect with each other. At the same time, all the nodes retain their original power-law distribution and the scale-free property in WSNs is inherited successfully.
Fig . 10a shows a scale-free network topology with 100 nodes by robustness enhancement in WSNs, which corresponds to Fig. 10a . The green solid lines represent the connection between nodes after a swapping operation. The black solid lines represent the edges that are consistent with the initial topology. In order to verify the onion-like feature of the scale-free network topology more intuitively, we redeployed the location of all the nodes according to depth first search (DFS), as shown in Fig. 10b . This process starts from the node with the highest degree, and considers only the connection relationship of nodes; it does not take into account the communication radius limitation. In Fig. 10b , the nodes with higher degree located in the central area are interconnected with each other. The nodes have a lower degree in the outer area of the scale-free network topology. The node degree diminishes gradually outward from the center. Fig. 10c , which corresponds to Fig. 10a , is further evidence that a scale-free network topology in WSNs maintains its original power-low distribution after robustness enhancement by the ROSE algorithm. Because the degree of each node is not changed, the scale-free property is perfectly inherited. Therefore, the scale-free network topology is also robust against random attacks. Fig. 11 shows scale-free network topologies with 300 nodes in WSNs after robustness enhancement, and corresponds to Fig. 6b. In Fig. 11a , many edges have been swapped, but the degree and location of each node have been maintained. As seen in Fig. 11b , DFS is also used to redeploy all nodes. The figure shows that the scale-free network topology resembles the onion-like structure more directly. In Fig. 11c, P (d) is the probability of a node having a degree d. It verifies that the scale-free property is preserved after robustness enhancement by ROSE.
D. Comparison of the Effect of ROSE and Other Algorithms on Scale-Free Network Topologies Having Different Edge Densities in WSNs
Scale-free network topologies having different edge densities were used to test the performance of ROSE. The number of nodes was fixed at 100 and the value of m was changed within the range 1 to 5 to meet the requirement of different edge densities. Fig. 12 demonstrates the performance of the ROSE, hill climbing, and simulated annealing algorithms. The results are averaged over k(k > 20) independent runs. As can be seen in Fig. 12 , the value of R shows a rising trend with an increase in the network density. All three algorithms improve the robustness significantly as compared to the initial scalefree networks. However, the robustness obtained by ROSE is better than that obtained by the hill climbing and simulated annealing algorithms.
The detailed data of the best, worst and average robustness results of each algorithm are listed in Table II . The error is derived from the variance in k(k > 20) independent runs as Eq. (15) . The larger the value of m, the greater is the scalefree network edge density. Furthermore, the best and worst robustness results obtained by ROSE are better than those of the hill climbing and simulated annealing algorithms. Independent edges are used in ROSE, and they shorten the running time in simulation experiments. With the increase in edge density, the proportion of independent edges further declines. Therefore, as compared with existing robustness enhancing algorithms, ROSE can achieve a better performance in a shorter time, as shown in Fig. 15 . Quite large differences exist between the running times of ROSE because of the randomness of the scale-free network topology in WSNs. Therefore, the error is derived from the equal proportional compression of standard deviation in k(k > 20) independent runs.
As can be seen in Fig. 15 , with an increase in density, the running time of each algorithm rises quickly. The efficiency of the simulated annealing algorithm is poorest, because it needs to tighten the probability of swapping edges many times. The running time of ROSE and the hill climbing algorithm is almost the same when m ≤ 2, whereas when m ≥ 3, the high efficiency of ROSE is more obvious. Independent edges become relatively few because of the addition of connections between nodes. The calculation of the value of R is complex, and therefore, a reduction in selected edges means a reduction in calculation and comparison time. Thus, ROSE can be completed in a shorter period of time.
E. Comparison of the Connectivity Under Attacks Before and After ROSE is Implemented
The network suffered two types of attack: random and malicious. ROSE can significantly improve the robustness of scale-free networks against malicious attacks without changing the initial degree distribution. The performance of ROSE under these attacks was simulated for scale-free network topologies in WSNs. The number of nodes was fixed at 100, the communication radius was 200 m, and the number of added edges was fixed at 2. The results are averaged over k(k > 10) independent runs. Fig. 13 shows the connectivity of the scale-free network under random attacks before and after ROSE was implemented. The green dotted line represents the number of nodes in maximal connected subgraphs when the network was fully connected. As can be seen in Fig. 13 , the two broken lines are almost coincident. This means that ROSE retains the scalefree property of the initial network well during the robustness enhancing process. When the number of random attacks is smaller than 25, both of them are close to the dotted line, and the majority of nodes in the remaining network remain connected. Random attacks have a small influence on the scale-free network. Only after more than a third of random nodes are attacked is the connectivity of the network damaged gradually. The scale-free model is tolerant against random attacks. Fig. 14 shows the connectivity of the scale-free network under malicious attacks before and after ROSE was implemented. The green dotted line represents the number of nodes in maximal connected subgraphs when the network was fully connected. As compared with random attacks, malicious attacks remove the maximum degree nodes each time. Therefore, the connectivity of the network is damaged more quickly. As can be seen in Fig. 14 , the number of nodes in maximal connected subgraphs for the initial BA network reduces fast. This means that a few instances of malicious attacks cause great damage to the scale-free network. It is fragile under malicious attacks. However, after the robustness enhancement of ROSE, the network remains connected when the number of malicious attacks is less than 20. ROSE significantly improves the robustness of scale-free networks against malicious attacks.
F. Extended Experiments
If the communication radius does not enable each node to cover around 50% nodes in average, we will use the K-means algorithm [39] to partition the network into clusters such that in each cluster, each node can averagely cover around 50% nodes. Then, we run ROSE on each cluster to make each cluster resemble the "Onion-like" structure.
The performance of ROSE in this case is plotted in Fig. 16 , in which we use the communication radius r = 100m (not large enough to cover 50% of nodes), such that we can obtain the R values by ROSE in partitioned topologies. We conducted experiments on different network sizes 100, 150, . . . , 300, and also on the two existing algorithms (Hill Climbing algorithm [26] and Simulated Annealing algorithm [27] ) for comparison purpose. All results in this plot are the averaged ones from k(k > 10) independent runs. In brief, Fig. 16 shows the following:
• Compared with the previous Fig. 9 , which plots the R values achieved by ROSE on non-partitioned topologies, the R values achieved by ROSE here are almost equally high, reflecting that applying ROSE with partitioning can still perform well.
• ROSE with partitioning remains outperforming Simulated Annealing and Hill Climbing.
VII. CONCLUSION
Fully considering the requirements of WSNs in practical applications, in the study presented in this paper, first a network model with the scale-free property based on the improved growth and preferential attachment processes from the wellknown BA model was built. A newly proposed algorithm called ROSE was designed for enhancing the robustness of scale-free networks against malicious attacks. The combination of a degree difference operation and an angle sum operation in the algorithm makes scale-free network topologies rapidly approach an onion-like structure without changing the original power-law distribution. Finally, the performance of ROSE was evaluated on scale-free network topologies having different sizes and edge densities. The simulation results show that ROSE significantly improves robustness against malicious attacks and retains the original scale-free property in WSNs at the same time. As compared with other existing algorithms (hill climbing and simulated annealing), ROSE shows better robustness enhancement results and consumes less computation time.
ROSE needs the information of the entire scale-free network topology to support the selection of independent edges. Therefore, the process for enhancing robustness against malicious attacks cannot directly be run in a distributed system. ROSE requires that global information be collected into the centralized calculation. Significantly high network density has a negative effect on the performance or efficiency of ROSE. Therefore, when the network density is controlled within a suitable range, this enhancing process can achieve better results and its completion requires a shorter time.
In future studies, we will focus on the application of complex network theory in WSNs. Given that this study considered only the scale-free model, and the proposed method is designed for homogeneous networks, in our next step we will attempt to combine the small world model with the scalefree model to address robustness in heterogeneous WSNs. The clustering approach that is more suitable for large scale networks in WSNs will also be studied in depth. 
